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dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model with long-term investors. We argue that the fact that 
prices can score worse or better than consensus opinion in predicting the fundamentals is a 
product of endogenous short-term speculation. For a given, positive level of residual payoff 
uncertainty, if noise trade displays low persistence rational investors act like market makers, 
accommodate the order flow, and prices are farther away from fundamentals compared to 
consensus. This defines a “Keynesian” region; the complementary region is “Hayekian” in 
that rational investors chase the trend and prices are systematically closer to fundamentals 
than average expectations. The standard case of no residual uncertainty and noise trading 
following a random walk is on the frontier of the two regions and identifies the set of deep 
parameters for which rational investors abide by Keynes’ dictum of concentrating on an asset 
“long term prospects and those only.” The analysis explains how accommodation and trend 
chasing strategies differ from momentum and reversal phenomena because of the different 
information sets that investors and an outside observer have. 
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Do investors excessively focus their attention on market aggregate behavior and public informa-
tion, disregarding their private judgement? Are asset prices aligned with the consensus opinion
(average expectations) on the fundamentals in the market? Undeniably, the issues above have
generated much debate among economists. In his General Theory, Keynes pioneered the vision
of stock markets as beauty contests where investors try to guess not the fundamental value of
an asset but the average opinion of other investors, and end up chasing the crowd.1 This view
tends to portray a stock market dominated by herding, behavioral biases, fads, booms and
crashes (see, for example, Shiller (2000)), and goes against the tradition of considering market
prices as aggregators of the dispersed information in the economy advocated by Hayek (1945).
According to the latter view prices reect, perhaps noisily, the collective information that each
trader has about the fundamental value of the asset (see, for example, Grossman (1989)), and
provide a reliable signal about assets' liquidation values.
Keynes distinguished between enterprise, or the activity of forecasting the prospective yield
of assets over their whole life, and speculation, or the activity of forecasting the psychology of the
market. In the former the investor focuses on the \long-term prospects and those only" while
in the latter he tries to anticipate a change in the convention that guides the stock market
valuation of actual investments. Keynes thought that in modern stock markets speculation
would be king. Recurrent episodes of bubbles or departures of asset prices from fundamental
values have the avor of Keynes' speculation with traders trying to guess what others will
do while prices seem far away from average expectations of fundamentals in the market. In
fact, a (somewhat simplistic) version of the Ecient Market Hypothesis (EMH) would say that
competition among rational investors will drive prices to be centered around the consensus
estimate of underlying value given available information. In other words, prices should equal
average expectations of value plus noise.2
In this paper, we address the tension between the Keynesian and the Hayekian visions in
a dynamic nite horizon market where investors, except for noise traders, have no behavioral
bias and hold a common prior on the liquidation value of the risky asset. We therefore allow
for the possibility that investors concentrate on \long-term prospects and those only" in a rich
noisy dynamic rational expectations environment where there is residual uncertainty on the
1Keynes' vision of the stock market as a beauty contest { i.e., the situation in which judges are more
concerned about the opinion of other judges than of the intrinsic merits of the participants in the contest { is
vividly expressed in the twelfth chapter of the General Theory: \...professional investment may be likened to
those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the Competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average
preferences of the competitor as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself
nds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are
looking at the problem from the same point of view." (Keynes, Ch. 12, General Theory, 1936).
2Professional investors attribute considerable importance to the consensus estimate as a guide to selecting
stocks. Bernstein (1996) reports how in 1995 Neil Wrigth, chief investment ocer of ANB Investment Manage-
ment & Trust, introduced a strategy \explicitly designed to avoid the Winner's Curse." Such a strategy was
based on the composition of a portfolio from stocks with a narrow trading range, \an indication that [these
stocks] are priced around consensus views, with sellers and buyers more or less evenly matched. The assumption
is that such stocks can be bought for little more than their consensus valuation."
2liquidation value of the asset (so that the collective information of rational investors is not
sucient to recover the fundamentals) and where noise trading follows a general process.
We nd that as long as rational investors nd it protable to engage in short-term specula-
tion, the simplistic EMH does not hold in our model.3 Furthermore, the fact that prices can be
systematically farther away or closer to fundamentals compared to consensus, or that they can
display over- or under-reliance on public information and score worse or better than consensus
in predicting the fundamentals are all manifestations of the same phenomenon: endogenous
short-term speculation. 4 In a static market investors speculate on the dierence between the
price and the liquidation value, prices are aligned with their average expectations about this
value, and investors put the optimal statistical weight on public information. Thus, in this
context the price is just a noisy measure of investors' consensus opinion. In a dynamic market,
investors speculate also on short-run price dierences. With heterogeneous information, this
may misalign prices and investors' average expectations, potentially leading prices either closer
or farther away from the fundamentals compared to consensus. Two key deep parameters, the
level of residual payo uncertainty and the degree of persistence of noise trades, determine
whether either over- or under-reliance on public information occur. When there is no resid-
ual uncertainty on the asset liquidation value and noise trading follows a random walk then
prices are aligned with consensus like in a static market. This is one of the boundary cases
where rational investors do not have incentives to speculate on short run price movements.
For a given, positive level of residual uncertainty, low persistence generates over-reliance; con-
versely, high noise trades' persistence tends to generate under-reliance on public information.
This partitions the parameter space into a Keynesian region, where prices are farther away from
fundamentals than average expectations, and a Hayekian region where the opposite occurs. The
boundary of these regions reects Keynes' situation where investors concentrate on \long-term
prospects and those only" and where the (simplistic) EMH holds. In the Keynesian region short
run price speculation based on market making motives (reversion of the noise trades process)
predominates, while in the Hayekian region short run price speculation based on information
(trend chasing) predominates. As a consequence we can characterize accommodation and trend
chasing strategies in a model with rational investors and study how do they map to momen-
tum (recent performance tends to persist in the near future) and reversal (a longer history of
performance tends to revert).
The intuition for our results is as follows. In a dynamic market, the relationship between
price and fundamentals depends both on the quality of investors' information and on their
reaction to the aggregate demand. Suppose an investor observes a positive signal and faces a
high demand for the asset. Upon the receipt of good news he increases his long position in
3It should be no surprise that in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium prices may be systematically closer
or farther away from the fundamentals compared with investors' average expectations. This result depends on
the relative weights that in equilibrium traders put on private and public information and, obviously, could not
arise in a fully revealing equilibrium where the price coincides with the liquidation value.
4Over-reliance on public information may have deleterious welfare consequences (see, e.g., Vives (1997),
Morris and Shin (2002), and Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). In this paper we stay within the bounds of a
positive analysis.
3the asset. On the other hand, his reaction to high asset demand is either to accommodate
it, counting on a future price reversal { thereby acting as a \market-maker"{ or to follow the
market and further increase his long position anticipating an additional price rise (in this way
\chasing" the trend). The more likely it is that the demand realization reverts over time,
e.g., due to liquidity traders' transient demand, the more likely that the investor will want to
accommodate it. Conversely, the more likely it is that the demand realization proxies for a stable
trend, e.g., due to the impact of fundamentals information, the more likely that the investor will
want to follow the market.5 In the former case, the investor's long-term speculative position
is partially oset by his market making position. Thus, the impact of private information on
the price is partially sterilized by investors' market making activity. This, in turn, loosens the
price from the fundamentals in relation to average expectations, yielding over-reliance on public
information. Conversely, in the latter case, the investor's reaction to the observed aggregate
demand realization reinforces his long-term speculative position. Thus, the impact of private
information on the price is enhanced by the investors' trend chasing activity. This tightens
the price to the fundamentals in relation to average expectations, and yields under-reliance on
public information. 6
Low noise trades' persistence strengthens the mean reversion in aggregate demand, and tilts
investors towards accommodating the aggregate demand. This eect is extreme when the stock
of noise traders' demand is independent across periods.7 The impact of residual uncertainty over
the liquidation value, on the other hand, enhances the hedging properties of future positions,
boosting investors' signal responsiveness and leading them to speculate more aggressively on
short-run price dierences. Thus, depending on the persistence of noise traders' demand, over-
or under-reliance on public information occurs, respectively yielding the Keynesian and the
Hayekian regions. Conversely, when noise traders' demand is very persistent (i.e., when noise
trades increments are i.i.d.) and absent residual uncertainty, investors act as in a static market,
and the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information. This, together with
the boundary between the Keynesian and the Hayekian regions, identies the set of parameter
values for which investors concentrate on the asset long term prospects, shying away from short
term speculation.
Interestingly, the Keynesian and Hayekian regions can be characterized in terms of in-
vestors' consensus opinion about the systematic behavior of future price changes. Indeed, in
the Hayekian region, investors chase the market because the consensus opinion is that prices
will systematically continue a given trend in the upcoming trading period. In the Keynesian
5In this case, indeed, the aggregate demand is likely to proxy for upcoming good news that are not yet
completely incorporated in the price. There is a vast empirical literature that documents the transient impact
of liquidity trades on asset prices as opposed to the permanent eect due to information-driven trades. See e.g.
Wang (1994), and Llorente et al. (2002).
6Other authors have emphasized the consequences of investors' reaction to the aggregate demand for an
asset. For example, Gennotte and Leland (1990) argue that investors may exacerbate the price impact of
trades, yielding potentially destabilizing outcomes, by extracting information from the order ow.
7Indeed, assuming that the stock of noise trade is i.i.d. implies that the gross position noise traders hold
in a given period n completely reverts in period n + 1. This lowers the risk of accommodating the aggregate
demand in any period, as investors can always count on the possibility of unwinding their inventory of the risky
asset to liquidity traders in the coming round of trade.
4region, instead, investors accommodate the aggregate demand because the consensus opinion is
that prices will systematically revert. We illustrate how expected price behavior under the lat-
ter metric does not always coincide with a prediction based on the unconditional correlation of
returns. This is due to the usual signal extraction problem investors face in the presence of het-
erogeneous information. Thus, in our setup, depending on the patterns of information arrival,
returns can display both reversal and momentum. However, these phenomena are compatible
with both the Hayekian and Keynesian equilibrium.
This paper contributes to the recent literature that analyzes the eect of higher order
expectations in asset pricing models where investors have dierential information, but agree on
a common prior over the liquidation value. In a dynamic market with risk averse short-term
investors, dierential information, and an independent stock of noisy supply across periods
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) argue that prices are always farther away from fundamentals
than traders' average expectations and display over-reliance on public information. We show
how Keynesian dynamics can arise with long-term investors and how the properties of the
noise trading process aect them. Indeed, in our market investors' short-term horizons arise
endogenously. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006b) study the role of higher order beliefs in asset
prices in an innite horizon model showing that higher order expectations add an additional
term to the traditional asset pricing equation, the higher order \wedge," which captures the
discrepancy between the price of the asset and the average expectations of the fundamentals.
According to our results, higher order beliefs do not necessarily enter the pricing equation.
In other words, for the higher order wedge to play a role in the asset price we need residual
uncertainty to aect the liquidation value or noise trade increments predictability when traders
have long horizons; Nimark (2007), in the context of Singleton (1987)'s model, shows that under
some conditions both the variance and the impact that expectations have on the price decrease
as the order of expectations increases.
Other authors have analyzed the role of higher order expectations in models where traders
hold dierent initial beliefs about the liquidation value. Biais and Bossaerts (1998) show that
departures from the common prior assumption rationalize peculiar trading patterns whereby
investors with low private valuations may decide to buy an asset from investors with higher
private valuations in the hope to resell it later on during the trading day at an even higher
price. Cao and Ou-Yang (2005) study conditions for the existence of bubbles and panics in a
model where investors' opinions about the liquidation value dier.8 Banerjee et al. (2006) show
that in a model with heterogeneous priors dierences in higher order beliefs may induce price
drift. In related research, Ottaviani and Srensen (2009) analyze a static binary prediction
market in which investors hold dierent priors about a relevant event. In this setup, they show
that the presence of wealth constraints leads the price to under-react to public information.
The paper also contributes to the literature analyzing asset pricing anomalies within the
rational expectations equilibrium paradigm. Biais, Bossaerts and Spatt (2008), in a multi-
asset, noisy, dynamic model with overlapping generations show that momentum can arise in
8Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide empirical evidence supporting the non-common prior assumption.
5equilibrium. Vayanos and Woolley (2008) present a theory of momentum and reversal based
on delegated portfolio considerations. We add to this literature by showing how momentum
and reversal relate to price over- and under-reliance on public information.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature emphasizing the existence of \limits to arbi-
trage." De Long et. al (1990) show how the risk posed by the existence of an unpredictable
component in the aggregate demand for an asset can crowd-out rational investors, thereby
limiting their arbitrage capabilities. 9 In our setup, it is precisely the risk of facing a reversal
in noise traders' positions that tilts informed investors towards accommodating the aggregate
demand. In turn, this eect is responsible for the over-reliance that asset prices place on public
information.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the static benchmark,
showing that in this framework the asset price places the optimal statistical weight on public
information and is just a noisy version of investors' average expectations. In section 3 we
analyze the dynamic model and argue that prices display over- or under-reliance on public
information whenever, in the presence of heterogeneous information, investors speculate on
short term returns. Section 4 analyzes the implications of our model for return regularities.
The nal section provides concluding remarks.
2 A Static Benchmark
Consider a one-period stock market where a single risky asset with liquidation value v +, and
a riskless asset with unitary return are traded by a continuum of risk-averse, informed investors
in the interval [0;1] together with noise traders. We assume that v  N( v; 1
v ),   N(0;
 1
 ),
and  orthogonal to v. Speculators have CARA preferences (denote with  the risk-tolerance
coecient) and maximize the expected utility of their wealth: Wi = (v   p)xi.10 Prior to the
opening of the market every informed investor i obtains private information on v, receiving a
signal si = v + i, i  N(0; 1
 ), and submits a demand schedule (generalized limit order) to
the market X(si;p) indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each realization of the
equilibrium price.11 Assume that v and i are independent for all i, and that error terms are
also independent across investors. Noise traders submit a random demand u (independent of all
other random variables in the model), where u  N(0; 1
u ). Finally, we make the convention
that, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 sidi equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel out in the
aggregate:
R 1
0 idi = 0).12 The random term  in the liquidation value thus denotes the residual
uncertainty aecting the nal pay o about which no investor possesses information, and can
be used as a proxy for the level of opaqueness that surrounds the value of fundamentals.13
9Kondor (2004) shows that limits to arbitrage also occur in a 2-period model where informed traders have
market power.
10We assume, without loss of generality with CARA preferences, that the non-random endowment of rational
investors is zero.
11The unique equilibrium in linear strategies of this model is symmetric.
12See Section 3.1 in the Technical Appendix of Vives (2008) for a justication of the convention.
13One can think that the actual liquidation value of the asset results from the sum of two, orthogonal, random
components: v and . The former relates to the \traditional" business of the rm, so that an analyst or an
6We denote by Ei[Y ], Vari[Y ] the expectation and the variance of the random variable Y
formed by an investor i, conditioning on the private and public information he has: Ei[Y ] =
E[Y jsi;p], Vari[Y ] = Var[Y jsi;p]. Finally, let E = =i, where i  (Vari[v]) 1, denote the
optimal statistical weight to private information, and  E[v] =
R 1
0 Ei[v]di.
We will use the above CARA-normal framework to investigate conditions under which the
equilibrium price is systematically farther away from the fundamentals compared to investors'
average expectations. Similarly as in Allen et al. (2006) this occurs whenever for all v,
jE [p   vjv]j >
 E
  E[v]   vjv
 : (1)
In the market, two estimators of the fundamentals are available: the equilibrium price, p, and
the average expectation investors hold about v (the \consensus opinion"),  E[v]. The above
condition then holds if, for any liquidation value, averaging out the impact of noise trades,
the discrepancy between the price and the fundamentals is always larger than that between
investors' consensus opinion and the fundamentals.14
Interestingly, condition (1) turns out to be satised whenever investors assign extra weight
to public information compared to the optimal statistical weight in the estimation of v. Equiv-
alently, (1) holds if and only if the price displays a weaker linear relationship with the funda-
mentals compared to investors' average opinion. These conclusions follow immediately from
the fact that at a linear equilibrium, for a given private signal responsiveness a > 0, the price








+ (1   P)E[vjp]; (2)
where P = a(1 + )=i, and   
 1
 i.
Indeed, owing to normality we know that
Ei[v] = Esi + (1   E)E[vjp];
where E  =i, denotes the optimal statistical weight to private information. Because of our
convention, we have
 E[v] = Ev + (1   E)E[v]: (3)
From (2) and (3) we have
p   v = (1   P)(E[vjp]   v) + P
1
a
u; and  E[v]   v = (1   E)(E[vjp]   v);
implying
E
  E[v]   vjv

= (1   E)(E[E[vjp]jv]   v); and E[p   vjv] = (1   P)(E[E[vjp]jv]   v):
Therefore, condition (1) holds if and only if the equilibrium price displays over-reliance on
public information in relation to the optimal statistical weight:
P < E: (4)
expert can obtain information about it. The latter component, instead, originates from decisions and actions
that insiders make and regarding which the market is totally clueless.
14That is, if condition (1) holds, the price is more biased than the average expectation in the estimation of
the fundamentals.
7As stated above we can also show that (1) holds if and only if the price as an estimator
of the fundamentals scores worse than the consensus opinion. To this end, we compute the
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where   Var[vjp] 1 = v + a2u. Similarly, we can compute the covariance between the
















Subtracting (6) from (5) yields
Cov








We collect the above results in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. In the static market, the following three conditions are equivalent:
jE [p   vjv]j >
 E
  E[v]   vjv
  (8)





In the static model it is easy to verify that a unique equilibrium in linear strategies exists
in the class of equilibria with a price functional of the form P (v;u) (see, e.g. Admati (1985),










denotes the market responsiveness to private information and is given by the unique solution
to the cubic equation (a)  a(1 + )    = 0.15 From the denition of P and E, we can
verify that




which, given (11), is clearly never satised. Therefore, we can conclude that in a static market,
condition (4) never holds, and the equilibrium price always assigns the optimal statistical weight
to public information.16
15It is easy to verify that (a) = a3u + a(v +  + )    = 0 possesses a unique real solution. Indeed,
(0) =   < 0, () = a(a2u+v+) > 0, implying that a real solution a exists in the interval (0;).
Finally, since 0(a)ja=a > 0, the result follows.
16If E[u] is non null, e.g. if E[u] =  u > 0, we have to replace the price p by the price net of the expected
noise component ^ p = p    uVari[v + ]=. Using this denition it is immediate to verify that also when  u > 0,
in a static market the equilibrium price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public information.
8Remark 1. The model introduced above captures the idea that, collectively taken, rational
investors do not know the ex-post liquidation value and is therefore qualitatively equivalent to
a market in which investors receive a signal with a common error term (like the one studied by
Grundy and McNichols (1989)). To see this, maintaining the informational assumptions of our
model, suppose that the ex-post liquidation value is given by v whereas investor i receives a
signal si = v++i. Then, it is easy to see that in this model there exists a unique equilibrium
in linear strategies in which X(si;p) = (a=E)(Ei[v]   p), where the optimal statistical weight
to private information is given by E  (( + a2u)v + ( + a2u + v)) 1, and a is the
unique real solution to the cubic '(a)  a3u + a( + )    = 0. As in our model, a is
bounded above by : a 2 (0;). With an improper prior about the liquidation value, v = 0
and the two models yield exactly the same result. When v > 0, it is possible to show that in
the model with a common error in the signal, investors' responsiveness to private information
is always higher than in the model considered here.17 2
Remark 2. There is an alternative, more direct way to verify whether condition (1) is satised.
Indeed, as investors' aggregate demand is proportional to
R 1
0 (Ei[v]   p)di, imposing market
clearing in the above model yields
Z 1
0





(Ei[v]   p)di + u = 0;
and solving for the equilibrium price we obtain




In other words, in equilibrium the price is given by the sum of investors' average expectations
and noise (times a constant). As u and v are by assumption orthogonal, we can therefore
conclude that in a static setup the price assigns the optimal statistical weight to public infor-
mation. To obtain over-reliance on public information, we thus need to nd conditions under
which investors' aggregate demand is no longer proportional to  E[v]   p and this, in a static
context with CARA preferences can never happen. 2
In the following sections we will argue that price over-reliance on public information can
be traced to investors' speculative activity on short-run price movements that makes strategies
depart from the solution of the static setup.
3 A 3-Period Model
Consider now a 3-period extension of the market considered in the previous section. We assume
that any speculator i 2 [0;1] has CARA preferences and maximizes the expected utility of his
17To see this it suces to note that the responsiveness to private information in our model is given by the
unique solution to (a) = a3u + a(v +  + )    = 0, whereas in the presence of a common errror in
the signal it is given by the solution to '(a)  a3u + a( + )    = 0. Now (0) = '(0) =   < 0,
and 0(0) = v +  +  > '0(0) =  + , which together with 00(a) = '00(a) = 6au, implies that the unique
solution to (a) = 0 always lays to the left of the unique solution to '(a) = 0.
9nal wealth Wi3 = (v   p3)xi3 +
P2
n=1(pn+1   pn)xin.18 In period n an informed investor i
receives a signal sin = v + in, where in  N(0; 1
n ), v and in are independent for all i;n
and error terms are also independent both across time periods and investors. Denote with
sn
i  fsitgn
t=1 and pn  fptgn
t=1, respectively, the sequence of private signals and prices an
investor observes at time n. Informed investors submit a demand schedule (generalized limit
order) to the market Xn(sn
i ;pn 1;pn) indicating the desired position in the risky asset for each
realization of the equilibrium price.
The stock of noise trades is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: n = n 1 + un, where
un  N(0; 1
u ) is orthogonal to n 1, and  2 [0;1].19 To interpret, suppose  < 1, then at
any period n > 1 market clearing involves the n   1-th and n-th period aggregate demands of
informed investors (respectively, xn 1 
R 1
0 xin 1di, and xn 
R 1
0 xindi), a fraction 1    of the
demand coming from the n   1-th generation of noise traders' who revert their positions, and
the demand of the new generation of noise traders. Considering the equilibrium conditions for
the rst two trading dates, and letting x2  x2   x1, 2  2   1 = u2 + (   1)1, this
implies
x1 + 1 = 0
x2 + 2 = 0 , x2 + 1 + u2 = 0:
Thus, assuming that noise trading follows an AR(1) process allows to take into account the
possibility that only part of the trades initiated by noise traders at time n actually reverts at
time n+1. The lower (higher) is , the higher (lower) is the fraction of period n noise traders
who will (will not) revert their positions at time n+1, and thus won't (will) be in the market at
time n+1. Equivalently, for 0   < 1, a high, positive demand from noise traders at time n is
unlikely to show up with the same intensity at time n+1, implying that Cov[n;n+1] < 0.20
Intuitively, a low  is likely to occur when the time between two consecutive trades is large.
Conversely, a high  depicts a situation in which the time between two consecutive transactions
is small, so that investors make repeated use of the market to satisfy their trading needs.21
18We assume, as before without loss of generality, that the non-random endowment of investors is zero.
19Our specication for the demand coming from noise traders is consistent with the following model. Replace
noise traders with a measure 1 sector of risk-averse, competitive hedgers who receive a random shock to their
endowment. A hedger i at time n receives a shock in = n+in where in is a normally distributed white-noise
error, uncorrelated with all the other random variables in the model. If we denote by U the risk-tolerance
of hedgers, then letting U ! 0 implies that each hedger gets rid of in in the market place. Owing to the
convention that
R 1
0 indi = 0, a.s., this in turn implies that the position hedgers hold at time n is given by
R 1
0 indi = n, yielding the random component of the aggregate demand that we assume in our model. This is
in line with Medrano and Vives (2004), who argue that upon receiving a shock to their endowment, innitely
risk-averse hedgers unwind their exposure to the market, yielding the random component of the aggregate
demand for the stock that characterizes the model with noise traders. It is worth noting that even in a static
model the presence of hedgers generates multiplicity of linear partially revealing equilibria (see, e.g., Ganguli
and Yang (2009) and Manzano and Vives (2010)).
20Alternatively, the AR(1) assumption for noise traders' demand can be interpreted as a way to parsimoniously
model the existence of a positive feedback in these traders' strategies. To see this, consider a 2-period version
of our model, then for  > 0, Corr[2;1] = =(1 + 2)1=2 > 0: For two normal random variables, positively
correlation is equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property. Therefore, we can conclude that if  > 0
the probability of observing a higher 2 increases in 1.
21The literature that has dealt with dynamic trading models featuring an AR(1) process for liquidity posits
10Extending the notation adopted in the previous section, we denote by Ein[Y ] = E[Y jsn
i ;pn],
En[Y ] = E[Y jpn] (Varin[Y ] = Var[Y jsn
i ;pn], Varn[Y ] = Var[Y jpn]), respectively the expectation
(variance) of the random variable Y formed by an investor conditioning on the private and
public information he has at time n, and that obtained conditioning on public information
only. Finally, we let En =
Pn
t=1 t=in, where in  (Varin[v]) 1 and make the convention
that, given v, at any time n the average signal
R 1
0 sindi equals v almost surely (i.e. errors cancel
out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 indi = 0).
3.1 The Equilibrium
In period 1  n  3 each informed investor has the vector of private signals sn
i available. It




t=1 tsit) is sucient for
the sequence sn
i in the estimation of v. An informed investor i in period n submits a limit order
Xn(~ sin;pn 1;), indicating the position desired at every price pn, contingent on his available
information. We will restrict attention to linear equilibria where in period n an investor trades
according to Xn(~ sin;pn) = an~ sin 'n(pn), where 'n() is a linear function of the price sequence
pn. Let us denote with zn the intercept of the n-th period net aggregate demand
R 1
0 xindi+un,
where xin = xin   xin 1. The random variable zn  anv + un represents the informational
addition brought about by the n-th period trading round, and can thus be interpreted as the
informational content of the n-th period order-ow (where, with a slight abuse of notation,




t=1 t > 0, at any linear equilibrium of the 3-period market the equi-







+ (1   Pn)En[v]; n = 1;2;3; (13)










(pn   En[v]); (14)





(Ei3[v]   p3); (15)
where En =
Pn
t=1 t=in, and expressions for Pn and an are provided in the appendix (see
equations (42), (60), (78), and (41), (56), (81), respectively). The parameters Pn and an are
positive for n = 2;3. Numerical simulations show that P1 > 0 and a1 > 0.
relatively high values for . For example, in their analysis of a dynamic FX market, Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2006) model the aggregate exposure to the exchange rate as an AR(1) process and in their numerical simulations
assume  = 0:8 (Table 1, p. 564). This assumption is somehow validated by empirical analysis. In a recent
paper, Easley et al. (2008) analyze the order arrival process using the daily number of buys and sell orders
for 16 stocks over a 15-year time period. Their ndings point to a highly persistent process for uninformed
investors.
11Proof. See the appendix. 2
Proposition 1 extends Vives (1995), restating a result due to He and Wang (1995), providing
an alternative, constructive proof. According to (13), at any period n the equilibrium price is a
weighted average of the market expectation about the fundamentals v, and a monotone trans-
formation of the n-th period aggregate demand intercept.22 A straightforward rearrangement
of (13) yields




= n (an (v   En[v]) + n):
According to (16), the discrepancy between pn and En[v] is due to the contribution that noise
traders are expected to give to the n-th period aggregate demand. The parameter n  Pn=an
is a measure of market depth. The smaller is n and the smaller is the anticipated (and realized)
contribution that the stock of noise gives to the aggregate demand and to the price.
At any period n < 3, an investor's strategy is the sum of two components. The rst
component captures the investor's activity based on his private estimation of the dierence
between the fundamentals and the n-th period equilibrium price. This can be considered as
\long-term" speculative trading, aimed at proting from the liquidation value of the asset. The
second component captures the investor's activity based on the extraction of order ow, i.e.
public, information. This trading is instead aimed at exploiting short-run movements in the
asset price determined by the evolution of the future aggregate demand. Upon observing this
information, and depending on the sign of the dierence Pn   En, investors engage either in
\market making" (when Pn   En < 0, thereby accommodating the aggregate demand) or in
\trend chasing" (when Pn   En > 0, thus following the market).23
To x ideas, consider the following example. Suppose that pn   En[v] > 0. According
to (16), we know that the market attributes the discrepancy between the price and the public
expectation to the presence of a positive expected stock of demand coming from noise traders:
En[n] > 0. An investor's reaction to this observation depends on whether he believes it to
be driven by noise or information. In the former (latter) case, the forward looking attitude
implied by rational behavior, would advise the investor to accommodate (join) the aggregate
demand in the expectation of a future price reversion (further increase).24 Suppose Pn < En,
then informed investors count on the reversal of noise traders' demand in the next period(s)
and take the other side of the market, acting as market makers. They thus short the asset
expecting to buy it back in the future at a lower price. 25 If, on the other hand, Pn > En,
22This is immediate since in any linear equilibrium
R 1
0 xindi + n = anv + n   'n(pn).
23He and Wang (1995) point out that in a market with long term investors the weights that prices and average
expectations assign to fundamentals can dier.
24In other words, owing to the traditional signal extraction problem, it is entirely possible that the sign of
En[n] is due to the presence of a positive demand coming from informed traders.
25When Pn  En < 0, the reaction to the aggregate demand investors display in the above example is akin
to a \contrarian" strategy. While value investors tend to buy at low prices in the expectation that the intrinsic
value of an asset will eventually show up, our investors take the other side of the market just to exploit the
regularity in the pattern of noise traders' demand.
12informed investors anticipate that the role of \positive" fundamental information looms large
in the n-th period aggregate demand and that this is most likely aecting the sign of En[n].
As a consequence, they buy the asset, expecting to re sell it once its price has incorporated the
positive news, eectively chasing the trend. 26
Finally, note that according to (15), in the third period investors concentrate in \long term
speculation." Indeed, at n = 3, investors anticipate that the asset will be liquidated in the next
period and thus that its value will not depend on the information contained in that period's
aggregate demand. As a consequence, they choose their position only taking into account their
information on the fundamentals, acting like in a static market.
Remark 3. While for N = 3 existence is daunting to show, assuming N = 2 we are able to prove
that an equilibrium in linear strategies always exists.27 In this latter case, multiple equilibria
may in principle arise. For some parameter values, it is easy to nd equilibria. For instance, if
noise increments are i.i.d., and investors only receive private information in the rst period (i.e.,
if  = 1 and 2 = 0), there always exists an equilibrium where a1 = a2 = (1+) 11, whereas
for large values of  another equilibrium where a1 = (u) 1(1++21u) > a2 = (1+) 11
may also arise (in line with what happens in a model where investors receive a signal containing
a common error term { see Remark 1). The rst equilibrium disappears when  < 1. In the
absence of residual uncertainty (i.e., if 
 1
 = 0),  = 0, and the equilibrium with a1 = a2 = 1
is unique (see Section 3.3). 2
As argued above, the dierence Pn En plays a crucial role in shaping investors' reactions
to public information and thus their trading behavior. In our static benchmark, on the other
hand, the same dierence also determines how \close" the price is to the fundamentals compared





Ein[v]di = Env + (1   En)En[v];
and using (13), a straightforward extension of the argument used in section 2 allows to obtain
the following
Corollary 1. At any linear equilibrium of the 3-period market, the following three conditions
are equivalent:
jE [pn   vjv]j >
 E
  En[v]   vjv
  (17)





Proof. To prove the equivalence between (17) and (18), we use here the direct proof, based on
the analysis of the market clearing equation, adopted in Section 2. Using the expression for
26Note that the intensity of the trading based on order ow information is positively related to the depth of
the period n market. Indeed, in a deeper market both a market maker and a market chaser face smaller adverse
price movements, and are thus willing to trade more aggressively.
27The proof is available from the authors upon request.
13strategies in Proposition 1, at any period n < 3 at equilibrium we have
Z 1
0
xindi + n = 0 ,
an
En







(pn   En[v]) + n = 0:
Solving for the price and rearranging yields







where En[n] = av(v   En[v]) + n. This, in turn, implies that







Thus, if Pn > En the price is closer to the fundamentals compared the consensus opinion,
while the opposite occurs whenever Pn < En.





























where n  Var[vjpn] = v + u
Pn
t=1 a2
t. We can now subtract (21) from (20) and obtain
Cov







implying that the price at time n over relies on public information if and only if the covariance
between the price and the fundamentals falls short of that between the consensus opinion and
the fundamentals. 2
We can now put together the results obtained in proposition 1 and corollary 1: if upon
observing the n-th period aggregate demand investors expect it to be mostly driven by noise
trades, they accommodate the order ow. As a consequence, their behavior drives the price
away from the fundamentals compared to the average market opinion. If, instead, they deem
the aggregate demand to be mostly information driven, they align their short term positions
to those of the market. This, in turn, drives the price closer to the fundamentals, compared to
investors' average expectations.
Alternatively, when investors speculate on short term returns the equilibrium price and the
consensus opinion have dierent dynamics:







Indeed, as the price originates from market clearing, it reects both determinants of investors'
demand, i.e. their long term forecast and their short term speculative activity. Conversely, as
14the consensus opinion is only based on investors' long term expectations, it does not reect the
impact of short term speculation.
To establish the direction of inequality (17) we thus need to determine what is the force
that drives an investor's reaction to the information contained in the aggregate demand. Prior
to that we consider a special case of our model in which investors do not receive private signals
at any period n. In this case short term speculation is disconnected from the existence of over-
or under-reliance of prices on public information, as we show in the following section.
3.2 Homogeneous Information and Short Term Speculation
In this section we assume away heterogeneous information, setting n = 0, for all n. This
considerably simplies the analysis and allows us to show that in the absence of heteroge-
neous information short term speculation does not lead prices to be systematically closer or
farther away from the fundamentals compared to investors' average expectations. We start by
characterizing the equilibrium in this setup, and then analyze its properties.
Proposition 2. In the 3-period market with homogeneous information, there exists a unique
equilibrium in linear strategies, where prices are given by
















(   1)2uv((1 + )(1   ) + 2uv)
(1 +  + 22uv)(1 + ) + 2uv(1 +  + 2uv)

; (27)




n (pn    v); n = 1;2;3: (28)
Proof. See the appendix 2
In a market with homogeneous information, at any period n investors have no private signal
to use when forming their position. As a consequence, the aggregate demand only reects the
stock of noise trades. According to (28), this implies that speculators always take the other
side of the market, buying the asset when pn <  v , n =  1
n (pn    v) < 0, and selling it
otherwise. Indeed, in the absence of private information, risk averse investors face no adverse
selection problem when they clear the market. The discrepancy between the equilibrium price
and the unconditional expected value reects the risk premium investors demand in order to
accommodate the liquidity needs of noise traders. Even in the absence of adverse selection risk,
in fact, investors anticipate the possibility that the liquidation value v may be lower (higher)
than the price they pay for (at which they sell) the asset.
15If  < 1, risk averse investors also speculate on short term asset price movements providing
additional order ow accommodation at any time n = 1;2. This can be seen rearranging (28)












(pn    v):
As a result, for  2 (0;1), market depth decreases across trading periods:
0 < 1 < 2 < 3;




as one can immediately see from (25), (26), and (27). The intuition for these results is that
if  < 1, as noise trades increments are negatively correlated, prior to the last trading round
investors have more opportunities to unload their risky position. This reduces the risk they bear,
and lowers the impact that the noise shock has on the price. If  = 1 noise trades increments
are i.i.d.. Therefore, speculators cannot count on the future reversion in the demand of noise
traders and their extra order ow accommodation disappears. As a consequence, depth is
constant across periods: 1 = 2 = 3 = (v) 1(1 + ).28
As one would intuitively expect, short term speculation arises insofar as investors can map
the partial predictability of noise trades' increments into the anticipation of short term returns.
The following proposition formalizes this intuition:
Corollary 2. At n = 1;2 investors speculate on short term asset price movements if and only
if, provided n > 0 (n < 0), they expect the next period return to revert: En[pn+1   pn] < 0
(En[pn+1   pn] > 0).
Proof. Using (24) we can easily obtain
En[pn+1   pn] = (n+1   n)n:
Fixing n = 2, and using (26) we then obtain
(3   2)2 = 3(   1)
1 + 




2 (   1)
1 + 
1 +  + 2uv
(p2    v):
In a similar way, xing n = 1, and using (27) yields
(2   1)1 = 2(   1)
(1 +  + 22uv)(1 + ) + 2(1 + )uv





(   1)(1 +  + 22uv)(1 + ) + 2(1 + )uv
(1 +  + 2uv)(1 + ) + 2uv(1 +  + 2uv)
(p1    v):
28This matches the result that He and Wang obtain when looking at the case of homogeneous information
when signal are fully informative on v, i.e. with n ! 1.
16Since for  2 [0;1), the terms multiplying n in (29) and (30) are both negative, En[pn+1 pn] <
0 , n > 0. If  = 1 investors do not speculate on short term returns, and 1 = 2 = 3 =
(v) 1(1+). This, in turn, implies that En[pn+1 pn] = 0, for n = 1;2, proving our claim. 2
Both in the market with homogeneous information and in the one with heterogeneous in-
formation investors speculate on short term returns. However, while in the latter market this
possibly leads to the fact that prices over-rely on public information, in the presence of sym-
metric information this never happens:
Corollary 3. With homogeneous information at n = 1;2;3, the price is as far away from the
fundamentals as investors' average expectations.
Proof. According to (24), the equilibrium price can be expressed as the sum of investors'
average expectations and a noise term n which is by assumption orthogonal to v. Hence,
E[pn   vjv] = E[ v + nn   vjv] =  v   v:
Given that investors do not have private information, the price only reects the noise term n,
and Ein[v] = E[v] =  v. Hence,
E
  En[v]   vjv

=  v   v:
Thus E[  En[v]   vjv] = E[pn   vjv], which proves our result. 2
As risk-averse investors have no private information to trade with, their orders do not
impound fundamental information in the price. As a consequence, as shown in Proposition 2,
at any period n investors are able to extract the realization of the noise stock n from the
observation of the aggregate demand, implying that the price perfectly reects n. As the
latter is orthogonal to  v, and in the absence of heterogeneous signals  En[v] =  v, both prices
and speculators' consensus opinion about fundamentals stand at the same \distance" from v.
The last result of this section draws an implication of our analysis for the time series
behavior of returns, showing that second and third period returns display reversal if noise trade
increments are correlated:
Corollary 4. At n = 1;2;3 returns exhibit reversal if and only if  < 1.
Proof. To see this, rst we compute the covariance between second and third period returns:















Given that as argued above 1 < 2, a necessary and sucient condition for Cov[p3   p2;p2  
p1] < 0 is that (3   2) < 0. We know from (29) that






1 +  + 2uv

< 0;
17for all  2 [0;1). Similarly, from (30), Cov[p2 p1;p1  v] = 1(2 1) 1
u < 0 for  2 [0;1).
Finally, Cov[v   p3;p3   p2] =  3(3 + (3   2)(1 + 2)) 1
u < 0 for  2 [0;1). 2
With homogeneous information, reversal occurs because with  < 1, the impact of liquidity
shocks \evaporates" across trading periods. Thus, a given liquidity shock un has a stronger
impact on the n-th period price compared to the (n + 1)-th price. As a consequence, the price
change spurred by un across times n and n+1 is negative, and more than compensates for any
eect generated by the former periods' liquidity shocks, implying that Cov[pn+1 pn;pn pn 1] <
0. To be sure, consider the following example. Suppose that u1;u2 > 0. Then rst period noise
traders' demand has a positive impact on the rst period price which is larger than the one it
has on the second and third period prices. In turn, the second period noise traders' demand has
a stronger positive impact on the second period price than on the third period price. Formally:
p3   p2 = 3u3 + (3   2)u2 + u1(3   2), and p2   p1 = 2u2 + (2   1)u1, with
n   n 1 < 0. Thus, both u1 and u2 have an impact on Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1], the former
is positive while the latter is negative. At equilibrium the latter eect is always stronger than
the former.
Summarizing, in the model with homogeneous information investors speculate on short term
asset price movements if and only if they can exploit the predictability of future noise trades'
increments. However, this is not enough to induce over- or under-reliance of prices on public
information. Indeed, in the absence of heterogeneous information, prices are as far away from
fundamentals as the consensus opinion. Furthermore, corollaries 2 and 4 imply that at any
time n = 1;2, and for all (;1=) 2 [0;1)  R+ the short term, contrarian strategy based on
the realization of n univocally maps into return reversal.
3.3 The Eect of Heterogeneous Information
As explained in Section 3.1, the assumption  < 1 implies that noise trades' increments are neg-
atively correlated, and introduces a mean reverting component in the evolution of the aggregate
demand. In the market with homogeneous information analyzed in Section 3.2, as the noise
stock is perfectly observable, this leads investors to speculate on short term returns, provid-
ing additional order ow accommodation. When investors have private signals, the aggregate
demand features also a component that reects fundamental information. As a consequence,
the noise stock cannot be perfectly retrieved, and informed investors face an adverse selection
problem. Thus, when faced with the aggregate demand, they estimate the noise stock and
choose the side of the market on which to stand, based on which component (noise or informa-
tion) they trust will inuence the evolution of the future aggregate demand. Mean reversion
in noise increments pushes investors to take the other side of the market (see Section 3.2). In
this section we will argue that with heterogeneous information, if 
 1
 > 0 investors scale up
their signal responsiveness prior to the last trading round. This, in turn, implies that prior
to the last trading round informed investors are more inclined to attribute a given aggregate
demand realization to the impounding of fundamental information, and are pushed to follow
the market. Both eects eventually bear on the magnitude of the weight the price assigns to
18the fundamentals:
Proposition 3. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium the weight
the price assigns to the fundamentals at time n = 1;2 is given by
P1 = E1
 
1 + (1   2)
1





















 i3, and the expressions for k
n, an are provided in the appendix for k;n 2 f1;2g (see
equations (61), (79), (80), and (41), (56), (81), respectively). The parameter 1
2 is positive.
Numerical simulations show that 1
1 > 0 and 2
1 > 0, and that 1  2  1.29
Proof. See the appendix. 2
According to the above result, at any linear equilibrium the magnitude of Pn depends on
the sign of the dierences 1 2 and 2 1. While  < 1 implies that noise traders' demand
increments are negatively correlated, n captures the deviation that residual uncertainty induces
in investors' signal responsiveness with respect to the \long term" solution.30
To better separate the impact that noise traders' mean reversion and the residual uncertainty
aecting fundamentals have on Pn, we start by considering the case in which 
 1
 = 0. In this
case  = 0, and there exists a unique equilibrium in linear strategies in the market (He and
Wang (1995) and Vives (1995)). Furthermore, n = 1 for all n, and a closed form solution is
available which partially simplies the analysis and allows to show
Corollary 5. In the absence of residual uncertainty, at any period n = 1;2, (a) an = 
Pn
t=1 t,
and (b) the n-th period price displays over reliance on public information if and only if  < 1.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
According to the above result, if 
 1
 = 0, investors' responsiveness to private information
matches the static solution. Hence, n = 1 and (31){(32) become
P1 = E1
 
















We know that 1
2 > 0 from proposition 3. In the appendix we show that 
 1
 = 0 implies
1
1 + 2
1 > 0, lending support to part (b) of the above corollary. Intuitively, if 
 1
 = 0,
when  < 1 at any time n = 1;2 the only source of predictability in the future aggregate
29Simulations have been run assuming that either private information ows at a constant rate in the three
trading periods (n = 1, for n = 2;3) or that it arrives in the rst period only (n = 0, for n = 2;3) with the
following parameter values: v;u;1 2 f:1;:2;:::;2g,  2 f0;:1;:::;1g and  2 f1;3g,  2 f1;10g.
30If at time n = 1;2 investors were to neglect short run price movements and be forced to focus on long term
speculation only, they would respond to their private information according to (1 + ) 1
Pn
t=1 t.
19demand comes from the mean reverting nature of the noise trading process, and investors' short
term behavior is akin to the one they display in the market with homogeneous information.
Thus, upon observing pn > En[v] , En[n] > 0 (pn < En[v] , En[n] < 0), investors
accommodate the expected positive noise traders' demand (supply), selling (buying) the asset in
the anticipation of a future price reversion. As these price movements do not reect fundamental
information, this drives the price away from the terminal pay o.
Corollary 5 argues that, absent residual uncertainty, investors' sole motive to speculate
on price dierences is the possibility to prot from the mean reversion of noise trades. This
suggests that shutting down this prediction channel should eliminate any short term speculative
activity:
Corollary 6. In the absence of residual uncertainty and assuming  = 1, Pn = En for
n = 1;2.
Proof. This follows immediately by replacing  = 1 in (34) and (35). 2
If 
 1
 = 0, and  = 1, noise trades increments are i.i.d. and at any period n < 3 investors
have no way to exploit the predictability of future periods' aggregate demand. As a consequence,
they concentrate their trading activity on long term speculation, and Pn = En.
We can now bring back the eect of residual uncertainty. As argued in section 3.1 in the
last trading round agents concentrate on the long term value of the asset, speculating as in a
static market without exploiting any pattern in the evolution of the aggregate demand. This







The above expression generalizes (11) and shows that in a static market with residual uncer-
tainty, the weight investors assign to private information is the risk-tolerance weighted sum of
their private signal precisions, scaled down by a factor 1 + , which is larger, the larger is 
 1
 .
Indeed, the larger is 
 1
 , the larger is the impact of residual uncertainty on the fundamen-
tals, and the less informative are investors' private signals about the liquidation value. Thus,
investors feel less condent about their information and scale down their signal responsiveness.
Residual uncertainty also aects a investor's signal responsiveness at any time n < 3, and







Expression (36), captures the deviation from the long term private signal responsiveness due
to the presence of residual uncertainty. As stated in proposition 3 our numerical simulations
show that in the presence of residual uncertainty 1  2  1. Thus, prior to the last trading
round, investors react to their private signals more aggressively than if they were just about to






; n = 1;2:
20Indeed, while residual uncertainty makes investors less condent about their signals, the pres-
ence of additional trading rounds increases the opportunities to adjust suboptimal positions
prior to liquidation. This, in turn, boosts investors' reaction to private information, the more,
the longer is the amount of time prior to liquidation, as more trading opportunities are available
to revise investors' positions. Furthermore, this also implies that a given aggregate demand re-
alization may be driven by informed investors, contributing to explain the component capturing
trading based on order ow information in investors' strategies:
Corollary 7. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium the second
period price displays over reliance on public information if and only if 2 < 1.
Proof. See the appendix. 2
To x ideas, suppose  = 1 and assume that at time 2 investors observe p2 > E2[v] (i.e.,
E2[2] > 0). Given that the demand of noise traders displays no predictable pattern, a short
term position based on shorting the asset in the anticipation of buying it back at a lower
price one period ahead is suboptimal. At the same time, the fact that 2  1 implies that
informed investors react more aggressively to their private signal than in a static market.
This generates additional informed trading which may be responsible for the observed price
realization. Informed investors thus go long in the asset in the anticipation of a further price
increase in the coming period. If  < 1, the mean reversion eect of noise trades kicks in and
investors' decisions as to the side of the market in which to position themselves needs to trade
o this latter pattern against the one driven by fundamental information.
For trend chasing to be optimal in the rst period, the impact of the mean reverting compo-
nent due to noise trades on future prices must be weaker than the eect of informed investors'
overreaction to private information in both periods. As 1
1 > 0 and 2
1 > 0, inspection of (31)
suggests that this depends on the sign of both 1   2 and 2   1. Indeed, we have the
following numerical result:
Numerical Result. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium of the
market, if 2 > 1, a sucient condition for P1 > E1 is that 1 > 2.
Thus, in the rst period having 1 > 2 is not enough to ensure that investors are willing
to chase the market if E1[1] > 0. The intuition is as follows. In the appendix we show that a
investor's rst period optimal strategy can also be expressed as follows,
X1(si1;p1) =  
1





where expressions for  1
1; 2
1; and  3
1 are provided in the appendix. Thus, in the rst period
both the second and third period expected positions impinge on a investor's decision. Suppose
p1 > E1[v] (i.e., E1[1] > 0), and 1 > 2, but 2 < 1. Upon observing a high rst period
price, given that 1 > 2 > 1, an investor may think to side with the market in the expectation
of selling in period 2 once the anticipated further appreciation has realized. This, however, is
21not enough. Indeed, given that 2 < 1, upon observing E2[2] > 0, (i.e., p2 > E2[v]) investors
in the second period, anticipating their third period position, will take the other side of the
market. This, in turn, may depress p2 and compromise the trend chasing strategy set up in
the rst period. Thus, if the mean reverting eect of noise trades leading to extra order ow
accommodation in the second period is strong enough, even if 1 > 2, in the rst period
investors will take the other side of the market. This, in turn, implies that P1 < E1.31
3.4 Public Information Reliance and Consensus Opinion: Keynes
vs. Hayek
Summarizing the results we obtained in the previous section, the systematic discrepancy be-
tween prices and the consensus opinion in the estimation of the fundamentals, depends on the
joint impact that noise trades' mean reversion and informed investors' overreaction to private
information have on short term speculative activity. According to corollary 5, lacking residual
uncertainty, noise trades' mean reversion pushes informed investors to act as market makers.
This pulls the price away from the fundamentals compared to the average market opinion.
When residual uncertainty is introduced, corollary 7 together with our numerical results imply
that the decision to \make" the market or \chase" the trend arises as a solution to the trade
o between the strength of noise trades' mean reversion and that of informed investors' overre-
action to private information. Finally, when noise trades' increments are i.i.d., corollary 6 and
proposition 3 respectively imply that lacking residual uncertainty investors concentrate on long
term speculation only, while introducing residual uncertainty they tend to chase the market.
This, in turn, leads to a price that is either as far away from, or closer to the fundamentals
compared to investors' average opinion. Table 1 summarizes this discussion.
Noise trades' persistence




 = 0 Pn < En Pn < En Pn = En

 1
 > 0 Pn < En Pn 7 En Pn > En
Table 1: A summary of the results for n = 1;2.
Our summary suggests that in both periods and for 
 1
  0, there must exist a  such that
Pn = En, and investors are willing to forgo short term speculation. Numerical simulations
conrm this insight as shown in gures 1 and 2. The gures plot the locus 
n  f(;1=) 2
31Notice that in the absence of residual uncertainty, this could not happen. In that case, the only source of
predictability comes from noise trades mean reversion. Thus, given that  is constant across time, provided
 < 1, the condition for price over- or under-reliance on public information does not change in the two trading
periods. To be sure, suppose that  = 0 and that at time 1 E1[1] > 0. Investors short the asset expecting
to buy it back either in period 2 or 3. If at time 2 E2[2] > 0, they keep shorting, coherently with what they
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Figure 1: The Keynesian and Hayekian regions for n = 1 with \constant" arrival of information:
n =  for n = 1;2;3. The bold, dotted, and thin curves are associated respectively to  = 1,
 = 1=2, and  = 1=4. The area to the left of each curve identies the set of parameter values
where over-reliance on public information occurs (i.e., the Keynesian region). Conversely, the
area to the right of each curve identies the set of parameter values yielding under-reliance on
public information (the Hayekian region).
[0;1]R+jPn = Eng, n = 1;2, assuming that investors receive a private signal in every trading
period of the same precision. At any period n, the set 
n divides the parameter space (;1=)
into a Keynesian region (to the left of the locus) with over-reliance on public information, and
a Hayekian region (the rest) where the opposite occurs. Formally, the Keynesian region is thus
given by the set
f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  R+jPn < En; n = 1;2g:
Conversely, the Hayekian region is given by
f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  R+jPn > En; n = 1;2g:
With no residual uncertainty (
 1
 = 0) and i.i.d. noise trade increments ( = 1), 
n = (1;0)
(corollary 6). The introduction of residual uncertainty, on the other hand, may have a non-
monotone eect on 
n. Observing the gures for small (large) values of 
 1
 the Hayekian
region widens (shrinks). This is especially true for high levels of risk tolerance. The intuition
is as follows. For small levels of residual uncertainty, the fact that speculators can re trade in
a dynamic market has a rst order impact on n as the possibility to readjust one's position
more than compensates for the increase in risk due to the augmented residual uncertainty over
the liquidation value. As 
 1
 grows larger, the possibility to retrade has an increasingly weaker
eect on an investor's dynamic responsiveness, as private signals become less and less relevant
to forecast the fundamentals. Investors thus scale back their responsiveness and more noise
trades persistence is needed to make investors forgo short term speculation.32
32According to the gures above as 
 1















Figure 2: The Keynesian and Hayekian regions for n = 2 with \constant" arrival of information:
n =  for n = 1;2;3. The bold, dotted, and thin curves are associated respectively to  = 1,
 = 1=2, and  = 1=4. The area to the left of each curve identies the set of parameter values
where over-reliance on public information occurs (i.e., the Keynesian region). Conversely, the
area to the right of each curve identies the set of parameter values yielding under-reliance on
public information (the Hayekian region).
According to our simulations, at any trading period the Hayekian (Keynesian) region widens
(shrinks) whenever the impact of investors' overreaction to private information on aggregate
demand realizations is strong. This occurs for large values of , , and u. When, on the other
hand, v is large, investors enter the market with suciently good prior information, and the
trading process is unlikely to have a strong informational impact on the price. In this case,
the Hayekian (Keynesian) region shrinks (widens). Interestingly, when investors only receive
information in the rst and second period we nd that P2 < E2. Similarly, our numerical
simulations show that if 2 = 0, the same happens in the rst period as well, implying that
the Hayekian region disappears in both period 1 and 2, and 
n = f(1;
 1
 ); for 
 1
 > 0g. The
intuition is as follows: from our previous analysis the reason why informed investors may want
to side with the market is that they believe that fundamental information drives the aggregate
demand realization. However, with this pattern of information arrival, investors do not receive
any new signal after the rst (or second) trading round. As a consequence, in the presence of a
mean reverting demand from noise traders, siding with the market exposes informed investors
to a considerable risk of trading in the expectation of a price increase (decrease) in the second
and third period and instead being faced with a price decrease (increase).33




1 becomes a constant. Indeed, in this case 
1 = f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  Rj1 = 1g, and lim
 1
 !1 1 =
(v + 1) 1(v + 1 + 2) > 1 is a constant that only depends on deep parameters. Therefore, 1 = 1 can
be explicitly solved, yielding  = (v + 1 + 2) 1(v + 1) < 1. In the three-period model our numerical
simulations show that a similar eect is at work.
33The gures in the text refer to a set of numerical simulations that were conducted assuming v;u;n 2
f1;4g,  2 f1=4;1=2;1g, and  2 f0;0:001;0:002;:::;1g, 
 1
 2 f0:1;0:2;:::;5g, for each pattern of private
information arrival.
24The set 
n captures the space of deep parameter values granting the existence of an equilib-
rium in which investors only focus on an asset \long-term prospects and those only." This is the
attitude towards investment that Keynes contrasted to the Beauty Contest (General Theory,
Ch. 12). The exclusive focus on an asset long term prospects arises either in the absence of
any systematic pattern in the evolution of the aggregate demand (as argued in corollary 6) or
when the forces backing trend chasing are exactly oset by those supporting market making
(as shown in gures 1 and 2). In both cases, along the region 
n, long term investors can
only devote their attention to forecasting the fundamentals, shying away from the exploitation
of the prots generated by short-term price movements. As a consequence, the price ends up
being as close to the fundamentals as the market average opinion.
Corollary 2 argues that in the presence of symmetric information it is possible to map
observed price departures from the public expectation at a given period n (i.e., pn   En[v]),
into a position which is coherent with investors' expectations about the future evolution of the
market price. The following corollary shows that an equivalent result also holds in the market
with heterogeneous information, characterizing the consensus opinion about the evolution of
future prices in the Hayekian and Keynesian regions:
Corollary 8. In the presence of residual uncertainty, at any linear equilibrium
E[p2   E2[v]jv] > 0 , E
  E2[p3   p2]jv

> 0;
if and only if P2 > E2. If 
 1
 = 0
E[pn   En[v]jv] > 0 , E
  En[pn+1   pn]jv

< 0:
Proof. See the appendix. 2
Thus, in the Hayekian (Keynesian) region, a systematic positive price departure from the
public expectation about the fundamentals at time 2 \generates" the consensus opinion that
prices will systematically further rise (decrease) in the third period. In the rst period numerical
simulations conrm that a similar result holds: E[p1   E1[v]jv] > 0 , E[  E1[p2   p1]jv] > 0.
If 
 1
 = 0 informed investors never overreact to their private information. Hence, provided
 < 1, only the Keynesian equilibrium can arise and a systematic positive discrepancy between
prices and public expectations creates the consensus opinion that prices will systematically
revert. Finally, along the region 
n, the market consensus opinion is that the next period price
won't change in any systematic way. As a consequence, E[  En[pn+1   pn]jv] = 0, and investors
concentrate on the asset long term prospects.
4 Reversal and Momentum
A vast empirical literature has evidenced the existence of return predictability based on a
stock's past performance. DeBondt and Thaler (1986) document a \reversal" eect, whereby
stocks with low past returns (losers) tend to outperform stocks with high past returns (win-
ners) over medium/long future horizons. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), instead, document a
25\momentum" eect, showing that recent past winners tend to outperform recent past losers
in the following near future. In our framework, as we argued in Section 3.2, when investors
have homogeneous information, noise trades' low persistence implies that returns are negatively
correlated, and thus exhibit reversal.34
In this section we consider the model with heterogeneous information, and analyze its im-
plications for returns' correlation. The introduction of a strongly persistent factor aecting
asset prices (i.e., fundamental information) contrasts the impact of the transient component
represented by the noise stock. As a consequence, and except for the case in which  = 0,
momentum and reversal can arise in both the Keynesian and the Hayekian equilibrium.
Using (16), we concentrate on the covariance between second and third period returns, as
this fully depends on endogenous prices:
Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] = Cov[E3[v]   E1[v];3E3[3]   1E1[1]] (37)
+Cov[2E2 [2]   1E1[1];3E3[3]   2E2[2]]:
Explicitly computing the covariances in (37) and rearranging yields:



















The latter expression shows that in a market with heterogeneous information the covariance of













which coincides with the expression given for the third period returns' covariance in the model
with homogeneous information. As we argued in Section 3.2, this component reects the
impact of the noise shocks aecting the rst and second period aggregate demand. The second












and captures the impact of the fundamental information shocks aecting the rst and second
period aggregate demand.
Inspection of (38) shows that if  = 0, then Cov[p3  p2;p2  p1] < 0, implying that if noise
trades' increments are strongly negatively correlated (i.e., the stock of noise trades is transient,
34More in detail, DeBondt and Thaler (1986) classify all the NYSE-traded stocks according to their past
three-year return in relation to the corresponding market average in the period spanning January 1926 to
December 1982 in stocks that outperform the market (\winners") and stocks that underperform it (\losers").
According to their results, in the following three years, portfolios of losers outperform the market by 19.6% on
average while portfolios of winners underperform the market by 5% on average. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),
classify NYSE stocks over the period from January 1963 to December 1989 according to their past six-month
returns. Their results show that the top prior winners tend to outperform the worst prior losers by an average
of 10% on an annual basis. Research on momentum and reversal is extensive (see Vayanos and Woolley (2008)
and Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008) for a survey of recent contributions).
26and i.i.d), returns can only exhibit reversal. Hence, when  = 0 equilibria are Keynesian (in
that the price over relies on public information) and display negative returns' autocorrelation.
As  increases away from zero, depending on the patterns of private information arrival,
momentum can arise. To see this, we start by assuming away residual uncertainty and set
 = 1, so that any pattern in the correlation of returns must depend on the time distribution
of private information. In this situation, as argued in Corollary 6, the equilibrium is unique











implying that, provided investors receive information at all trading dates, and dierently from
what happens in the market with homogeneous information, market depth improves over time.35
As a consequence, 3 < 2 and, similarly to the case with homogeneous information, the impact
of a given liquidity shock \evaporates" across trading periods. Note, however, that as now
market depth depends on the patterns of information arrival, the presence of heterogeneous
information makes it possible for the impact of the rst period liquidity shock to overpower
that of the liquidity shock arriving in the second period. Indeed, as one can verify:











and given that (1 + ua1) 1i1 > 1, we can conclude that with no residual uncertainty
and i.i.d. noise increments, returns are positively correlated provided that investors receive
private information at all trading dates (i.e., n > 0, for all n), and the quality of such
information shows sucient improvement across periods 1 and 2. In this situation, market
depth considerably increases between the rst and second period. This implies that the impact
of the rst period liquidity shock is always stronger than the one coming from u2, building a
positive trend in returns.36 Furthermore, a large second period private precision strengthens
the impact of fundamental information, eventually yielding Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] > 0.
When  < 1 (keeping 
 1
 = 0), noise trades' persistence is lower and this helps to generate
a negative covariance. As a result, the value of 2 which is needed for the model to display
momentum, increases. Adding residual uncertainty, lowers investors' responsiveness to private
information. This, in turn, implies that for any , the value of 2 that triggers momentum
further increases (see Figure 3).
Summarizing, when  = 0 as argued in section 3.4 the Keynesian equilibrium realizes. There
we obtain excessive reliance on public information, and prices that are farther away from the
fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion. Investors accommodate a positive expected
liquidity demand, as the consensus opinion is that prices systematically revert. Furthermore,
returns are negatively correlated. As  grows larger, for intermediate values of the residual
35In the market with homogeneous information if  = 1, n = (v) 1(1 + ), for n = 1;2;3.












Figure 3: The gure displays the set f(;2) 2 [0;1]R+jCov[p3 p2;p2 p1] = 0g, partitioning
the parameter space [0;1]  R+ into two regions: points above the plot identify the values of
(;2) such that there is momentum. Points below the plot identify the values of (;2) such
that there is reversal. Parameters' values are v = u = 1 = 3 = 1. The thin, thick and
dotted line respectively correspond to 
 1
 = 0, 
 1
 = :2, and 
 1
 = :3.
uncertainty parameter the Hayekian equilibrium may occur, with insucient reliance on public
information, and prices that are closer to the fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion.
Upon observing a positive realization of the expected liquidity demand, investors chase the
trend, as in this case the consensus opinion is that prices will systematically increase. In this
equilibrium, momentum obtains provided that the quality of investors' private information
improves suciently across trading dates. Momentum and reversal are therefore compatible
with both types of equilibria.37
Inspection of gure 3 suggests that for a given 2, higher values of 1= require a larger noise
trades' persistence for Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] = 0. Numerical simulations conrm this insight,
showing that the set of parameter values (;1=) for which Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] is null has
the shape displayed by the thick line in gure 4. Points above (below) the thick line represent
combinations of (;1=) such that the third period returns display reversal (momentum),
so that Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] < 0 (Cov[p3   p2;p2   p1] > 0). It is useful to also draw the
set 
2 = f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  R+jP2 = E2g for the chosen parameter conguration. This
partitions the parameter space [0;1]  R+ into four regions. Starting from the region HR in
which there is under reliance on public information and reversal and moving clockwise, we have
the region HM with under reliance on public information and momentum; the region KM
with over reliance on public information and momentum; the region KR with over reliance on
public information and reversal.38
37Therefore, as momentum can arise also in the Keynesian region, a price runup is entirely compatible with
a situation in which prices are farther away from the fundamentals compared with the consensus opinion.
38In the gure we use parameters' values in line with Cho and Krishnan (2000)'s estimates based on S&P500
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Figure 4: The gure displays the set 
2 = f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  R+jP2 = E2g (thin line) and
the set f(;1=) 2 [0;1]  R+jCov[p3   p2;p2   p1] = 0g (thick line). Parameters' values are
v = 1=25, u = 1=0:0112,  = 1=2 and 1 = 1=144, 2 = 3 = 4=144.
According to Corollary 8, in the Hayekian (Keynesian) region investors' short term strategies
reect the consensus opinion about the systematic behavior of future prices. For instance, in
the region to the right of 
2 (i.e., the region H), a systematic positive discrepancy between
p2 and E2[v] creates the consensus opinion that the third period price will increase above
p2. This rationalizes informed investors' decisions to ride the market upon observing p2  
E2[v] > 0. As gure 4 claries, in this region the consensus opinion about the systematic future
price behavior does not always coincide with the forecast based on unconditional correlation.
Indeed, suppose that at time 2 investors observe p2 > p1 > E2[v]. For (;1=) 2 HR,
unconditional correlation predicts that the short term increase in prices across the rst two
periods will be followed by a reversal, in stark contrast with the prediction based on the
consensus opinion. To understand the reason for this dierence, it is useful to refer to the
case with homogeneous information. In that case, upon observing the realization of a positive
noise stock 2 > 0, investors speculate on short run price dierences by taking the other side
of the market. Furthermore, unconditional correlation predicts a price reversal. Indeed, with
homogeneous information the only factor moving prices is represented by noise traders' demand
which is transient. Therefore, both a positive liquidity stock and a price increase are deemed to
be temporary. In the presence of heterogeneous information, on the other hand, fundamental
information, which is persistent, also aects prices. This contrasts the mean reverting impact
of noise, creating a signal extraction problem, and implying that investors have to base their
short term strategies on the realization of the expected noise stock, E2[2], ltered out of the
observed aggregate demand. In this situation, it is natural that the anticipation of future price
behavior crucially depends on the information set on which such a forecast is based.
The latter result is reminiscent of Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2008) who study the empirical
implications that a multi-asset, dynamic, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model has for
29optimal trading behavior. One of their ndings points to the existence of a discrepancy between
momentum strategies based on unconditional correlation and the optimal, price contingent
strategies that investors adopt in their model.39
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between prices and consensus opinion as
estimators of the fundamentals. We have shown that whenever heterogeneously informed, long
term investors nd it optimal to exploit short term price movements, prices can either be
systematically farther away or closer to the fundamentals compared to the consensus opinion.
This gives rise to a Keynesian and a Hayekian region in the space of our deep parameters (i.e.,
the persistence of noise trades and the dispersion of residual uncertainty aecting the asset
liquidation value). In the Hayekian (Keynesian) region a systematic positive price departure
from the public expectation about the fundamentals \generates" the consensus opinion that
prices will systematically further rise (decrease) in the upcoming period. On the boundary
between the two regions, on the other hand, the market consensus opinion is that the next
period price won't change in any systematic way. As a consequence, investors concentrate on
\the asset long term prospects and those only," abiding by Keynes's dictum.
Our paper provides a number of empirical implications. According to our results, for a given
level of residual uncertainty, investors tend to use accommodating strategies when noise trading
is strongly mean reverting. Conversely, they are trend chasers when noise trading is close to
random walk and there is a continuous ow of private information. The latter parameter region
widens when investors are more risk tolerant, receive better private information and a lower
level of noise aects prices.
Furthermore, as in our setup the evolution of prices is governed by a transient and a per-
sistent component, depending on the quality of private information, our model can generate
empirically documented return regularities. Interacting the space of parameter values yielding
momentum and reversal with the Keynesian and Hayekian regions, we have illustrated that the
set of deep parameters yielding the two phenomena are dierent. As we argued, the consensus
opinion can be taken as a measure of the market view of an asset fundamentals which, dierently
from the market price, is free from the inuence of short term speculation dynamics. Therefore,
our theory gives indications as to when a price runup (momentum) should be associated with
a situation in which prices are a better or worse indicator of the liquidation value compared to
consensus. Low residual uncertainty in the liquidation value together with a high noise trades'
persistence are likely to characterize situations of the rst type. On the other hand, low noise
trades' persistence (again coupled with low residual uncertainty) can be responsible of prices
growing increasingly apart from fundamentals compared to the market consensus opinion.40
39Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2008) also nd that price contingent strategies are empirically superior to
momentum strategies.
40From an empirical point of view, our \Hayekian" and \Keynesian" regions can potentially be identied ex-
post by estimating the covariance of prices and consensus with the fundamentals. This enables to characterize
when situations in which the market view is at odds with prices are a signal that consensus should be trusted
30Overall, our analysis points to the fact that the predictability of the aggregate demand
evolution leads long-term investors to speculate on short-term returns, in turn implying that
the simplistic EMH is likely to fail. We identify two factors which may explain this result: the
persistence of noise trades and the opaqueness of fundamentals. Indeed, as we have shown,
low noise trades persistence together with opaque fundamentals make the evolution of the
aggregate demand, and thus of the asset returns, predictable. This lures investors towards
the exploitation of these regularities, partially diverting them from the activity of evaluating
the fundamentals. As a result, the equilibrium price ends up reecting both components of
investors' strategies (long and short term speculation), decoupling its dynamic from that of the
consensus opinion. In these conditions, we have also argued that reversal occurs, and prices
display over-reliance on public information. Momentum, instead, needs high noise trading
persistence, and a transparent environment to arise. Hence, insofar as a high  proxies for a
high trading frequency, we can conclude that any technological arrangement conducive to an
increase in trading frequency together with improved disclosure is likely to promote positive
return correlation and price under-reliance on public information.
A number of issues are left for future research. Our analysis has concentrated on the
case in which investors have long horizons. Indeed, short term speculation in our setup arises
endogenously whenever investors nd it optimal to exploit regularities in the evolution of future
returns. In a companion paper we analyze the implications of forcing on investors a short term
horizon and show that in our general framework this is conducive to multiple equilibria with
either Keynesian or Hayekian features (Cespa and Vives (2009)). Furthermore, while our paper
gives a very detailed characterization of the conditions leading to investors' over-reliance on
public information, it does not assess the welfare consequences that this may have for market
participants. In particular, in the Keynesian equilibrium informed investors explicitly take
advantage of noise traders, exploiting the low persistence of their demand shocks. A model in
which the noise in the price is due to rational traders entering the market to hedge a shock to
their endowment would allow to analyze the welfare properties of this equilibrium. Furthermore,
it would also allow to see whether in response to informed investors' activity liquidity patterns
can change over time, thereby inducing a time-varying degree of noise trades' persistence, and
ultimately aecting the sign and magnitude of the discrepancy between prices and average
expectations in the estimation of fundamentals.41
as a better indicator of ex-post liquidation value. Indeed, as we show in section 4, the fact that momentum
and reversal can occur in both the H and K regions implies that in some cases we should trust price runups
to be strong indicators of value (compared to consensus), whereas in other cases, this is not true. Of course,
the testability of these implications relies on the availability of reliable information on consensus estimates
which is not easy to obtain because of incentive issues of market professionals which are likely to induce biases
(see Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and the references cited therein). More recently, however, survey data based on
investor beliefs which circumvent incentive issues start being collected (see, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and
Piazzesi and Schneider (2009)).
41Several authors have made a foray into the welfare analysis of noisy, dynamic rational expectations equilib-
rium models (see, e.g., Brennan and Cao (1996), and Cespa and Foucault (2008)).
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34A Appendix
The following lemma establishes that working with the sequence zn  fztgn
t=1 is equivalent to
working with pn  fptgn
t=1:
Lemma 2. In any linear equilibrium the sequence of informational additions zn is observation-
ally equivalent to pn.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in linear strategies xin = an~ sin   'n(pn). In the rst
period imposing market clearing yields
R 1
0 a1si1   '1(p1)di + 1 = a1v   '1(p1) + 1 = 0 or,
denoting with z1 = a1v+1 the informational content of the rst period order-ow, z1 = '1(p1),
where '1() is a linear function. Hence, z1 and p1 are observationally equivalent. Suppose now
that zn 1 = fz1;z2;:::;zn 1g and pn 1 = fp1;p2;:::;pn 1g are observationally equivalent and
consider the n-th period market clearing condition:
R 1
0 Xn(~ sin;pn 1;pn)di + n = 0. Adding
and subtracting
Pn 1





where 'n() is a linear function, zt = atv + ut denotes the informational content of the t-th
period order-ow, and at = at   at 1,. As by assumption pn 1 and zn 1 are observationally
equivalent, it follows that observing pn is equivalent to observing zn. 2
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove our argument, we proceed backwards. In the last trading period traders act as in




























 i3. An alternative way of writing the third period equilibrium price is














t=1 2 tzt) + (1   P3)a32E2[v]
P33a2 + (1   P3)a32
=
2E2[v] + (1 + )(z2 + z1)
2 + a2(1 + )
; (45)
zn = anv + un, and an = an   an 1.
Second Period
Substituting (39) in the second period objective function, a trader in the second period
maximizes














Let i2 = (p3   p2)xi2 + x2
i3Vari3[v + ]=(2). The term i2 is a quadratic form of the random
vector Z2 = (xi3   1;p3   2)0, which is normally distributed (conditionally on f~ si2;z2g) with









(a3(1 + )   3)2u + i2((1 + )2 + 2u3)
i2u(1 + )2 ;
Covi2[xi3;p3] = 3
 

















1  Ei2[xi3] =
a3(1   3a3)
E3
(Ei2[v]   ^ p2) (48)
2  Ei2[p3] = 3a3Ei2[v] + (1   3a3)^ p2: (49)
Writing in matrix form:





where c2 = (2   p2)xi2 + 2
1Vari3[v + ]=(2), b2 = (1Vari3[v + ]=;xi2)0, and A2 is a 2  2
matrix with a11 = Vari3[v+]=(2) and the rest zeroes. Using a well-known result from normal
theory we can now rewrite the objective function (46) as






















36Maximizing the above function with respect to xi2 yields
xi2 =  
1
























3i3((1 + )(3 +
P2





















(Ei2[v]   ^ p2)  

h2;22
(p2   ^ p2); (55)




t=1 t)i3(1 + )(1 + ua3)
(1 +  + ua3)(3 + (3 +
P2
t=1 t)(1 + ))
: (56)





(Ei2[v]   ^ p2)di  

h2;22
(p2   ^ p2) + 2 = 0;
which after rearranging implies
2(2   1)




(^ p2   p2); (57)
where 2  a2(1 + )=(
P2
t=1 t). As a consequence, a trader i's second period strategy can





(Ei2[v]   p2) +
( + h2;21)(2   1)2
i3
E2[2]: (58)
Using (55) we can obtain an expression for the second period equilibrium price that claries




   E2[v]   p2

+
( + h2;21)(2   1)2
i3
E2[2] + 2 = 0;
where  E2[v] 
R 1




















2u(2 + a2(1 + ) + i2)
D2
> 0: (61)










(p2   E2[v]): (62)
Finally, note that in period 2 as well we can obtain a recursive expression for the price that
conrms the formula obtained in (43). Indeed, rearranging (59) we obtain









measures the price impact of the new information contained in the second period aggregate
demand (since
R 1
0 xi2di + 2 = a2v + 2   '2(p1;p2) = z2 + z1   '2(p1;p2)), and
^ p1 =
P22z1 + (1   P2)a21E1[v]
P22a1 + (1   P2)a21
: (65)
An alternative expression for 2 is as follows:
2 =
1 +  + u2a2








2 denotes the \static" measure of the price impact of trade. The above expression thus
highlights how noise trade predictability and the presence of residual uncertainty aect the
static measure of the price impact of trade.
First Period
















































































The rst period objective function now reads as follows:


























(Ei2[v]   E2[v])   Ei2[2];
we have
Ei2[v]   E2[v] =
(1 + )(Ei2[xi3] + Ei2[2])
2
;
and replacing the latter in the expression for xi2 yields
Ei2[xi3] =
xi2 + (1   2)Ei2[2]
2
: (68)
Thus, denoting by i1 the argument of the exponential in (67) we obtain:














Finally, as one can verify, letting 1 = E2, 2 =  (2i2) 1(2 a2a2u), and 3 = 1, we have
1xi2 + 2p2 + 3Ei2[2] =
1
2i2
(a2uz1   1E1[v])  c(z1); (69)
implying that




Given a trader's information set at time 1, c(z1) is a constant. Hence, the uncertainty that a
trader i faces at time 1 is reected in i1 through p2 and xi2 only:












(1   (1   2)E2)xi2 + c(z1)(1   2) +





39The term i1 is a quadratic form of the random vector Z1  (xi2   1; p2   2), which is












(Ei1[v]   ^ p1) +
a21(P2   E2)
P2E22
(^ p1   E1[v]); (71)
and 2  Ei1[p2],





t=1 t   a22)2u + i1((
P2






















Writing in matrix form:











2 + 2(m11c(z1) + m22c(z1) + a1212);








































1   (1   2)E2
1   2








Along the lines of the second period maximization problem we then obtain






















40Maximizing (73) with respect to xi1, solving for xi1 and rearranging yields
X1(si1;p1) =  
1



















2(1 + )2u((2   1)i22h1;22 + i3(1   3a3)h1;12)
D2h1;22
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2 + 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u + 
2












































































1 + (1   2)
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i33(1 + )3(1 + ua3)2
2
2D22















2u(a2(1 + ) + 21)(i3(1   3a3) + i2)
i2D2
;






















(p1   E1[v]): (82)
Note that (82), together with (77) show that the expressions for equilibrium prices and traders'
strategies have a recursive structure. Finally, note that as obtained in periods 2 and 3, we can
express the rst period equilibrium price as follows









This completes our proof.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2









t=1 t)i3(1 + )(1 + ua3)
(1 +  + ua3)(3 + (3 +
P2
t=1 t)(1 + ))
;
we immediately obtain a2 = a3 = 0. Note that this is in line with what one should assume
in a linear equilibrium where traders possess no private information. Indeed, at any candidate
linear equilibrium a trader's strategy at time n is given by Xn(pn) = '(pn), where '() is a
linear function. Imposing market clearing, in turn implies that '(pn) = n, so that at any linear
equilibrium the price only incorporates the supply shock (an = 0) which is therefore perfectly
revealed to risk averse speculators.
This, in turn, implies that n = in = v,
En[v] = Ein[v] =  v;
and that Pn = En = 0. Now, we can go on and characterize the strategies that traders adopt,










( v   p2) +
(   1)32
vu
(1 + )(1 +  + 2uv)
(p2    v): (84)










(1 + )(1 +  + 2uv)
:
Imposing market clearing we obtain:
p2 =  v +
(   1)(1 + )u





Given that a2 = 0, z2 = u2, and since traders at time 2 have also observed z1 = 1, the second
period stock of noise 2 = 1 + u2 can be exactly determined, and
E2[2] = 2:
Hence, as argued above, traders perfectly anticipate the noise shock and accommodate it, and
the price only reects noise. But then this implies that
p2 =  v +
(   1)(1 + )u





As a last step we need to characterize the rst period equilibrium. Substituting the second
period optimal strategy in the corresponding objective function and rearranging, at time 1 a









(p2   p1)xi1 +
(1 + )(1 +  + 2vu)






According to (85) p2 only depends on 2. Hence, in the rst period the argument of the trader's














and we can apply the usual transformation to compute the above expectation, obtaining that
the function maximized by the trader is given by







(1 +  + 2uv)(1 + )
(1 +  + 2uv)v
; m2 =
(1 +  + 22uv)(1 + )
(1 +  + 2uv)2v
:




( v   p1) (87)
+
(   1)((1 +  + 2uv)(1 +  + 2uv(1 + )) + (1 + )2(1   ))
(1 + )(1 +  + 2uv)((1 +  + 2uv)2 + 42
u2
v(1   ))
(p1    v):
Imposing market clearing and explicitly solving for the price







(   1)((1 +  + 2uv)(1 +  + 2uv(1 + )) + (1 + )2(1   ))





which can be rearranged to obtain (27). QED
43Proof of Proposition 3
Follows immediately from the denition of equations (60), and (78).
QED
Proof of Corollary 5
Note that for  = 0 (41) and (56) imply an = (
Pn
t=1 t), for n = 2;3. Hence, 2 = 1






































2i1 + (1   2a2)
2u +








(Ei1[v]   p1) +

h1;22
(1   i1h1;22)(^ p1   p1) (93)
 











  (1 + a1)(a2u(1   2a2)   2i1)+
 




since, as one can verify,
D1
i2
= 2i1(1 + a2u) + (1   2a2)u(1 + a1)+
+
(1   )(2   a2a2u)a2u((1   )(2   a2a2u)   (2 + a2)(1   22))
D2
:















(^ p1   p1):
44We can now substitute (95) in (93). Imposing market clearing and rearranging allows to obtain














(1   )u(2   a2a2u)(i33)2
2D2
2





Finally, for P2, using (90), the result stated in the corollary is immediate. For P1, inspection
















(1   )u(2   a2a2u)(i33)2
2D2
2





can be veried to be always positive. QED
Proof of Corollary 8
For the rst part of the corollary, consider the following argument. From the rst order

































The rst line in the above equation respectively captures the impact that the expected change in
price and the expected third period position have on traders' aggregate second period strategy.































h2;21(1 + )(1   E2)(1   2)
h2;222i2i3
E [E2[2]jv];
45must have opposite sign. Given that h2;21 can be veried to be negative, this implies that if
(and only if) 2 > 1, E[  E2[p3 p2]jv] is positive. If  = 0, then a similar argument shows that
at time 2 E[p2   E2[v]jv] < 0 , E[  E2[p3   p2]jv] > 0 for  < 1.















E1[1] = ^ p1   p1:
Averaging out noise in the above expression, in this case the sign of E[  E1[p2   p1]jv] depends










which after rearranging can be shown to be always negative provided  < 1.
QED
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